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It is with great pleasure that I share 
CARGC Paper 13, “Toward a Cultural 
Framework of  Internet Governance: 
Russia’s Great Power Identity and the 
Quest for a Multipolar Digital Order” 
by Stanislav Budnitsky. Stanislav joined 
CARGC as a 2018-2020 Postdoctoral 
Fellow from Carleton University in 
Ottawa, Canada where he received his 
PhD from the School of  Journalism 
and Communication in 2018. A 
graduate of  Moscow’s National 
Research University, Stanislav has held 
fellowships with the Summer Media 
Policy Institute at Oxford University, 
the Berkman Klein Center for Internet 
and Society at Harvard University, and 
the Stanford US-Russia Forum. Prior 
to graduate studies, he worked as a 
media producer and writer in Russia. 
CARGC Paper 13 makes an important 
and timely contribution to current 
debates about Russia’s approach 
to internet governance. It proposes 
the term of  digital multipolarity to 
re-think Russia’s global internet 
governance policies away from the 
often reductionist equation of  Russia’s 
discourse of  digital sovereignty with 
Putin’s authoritarian regime. Instead, 
Stanislav’s paper invites us to consider 
the historical continuities in Russia’s 
strategic pursuit of  multipolarity. A 
close reading and intertextual analysis 
of  Russia’s internet discourse starting 
in the mid-1990s during Boris Yeltsin’s 
first term highlights how multipolarity 
as a priority in global internet 
governance pre-dates the recent 
nationalist turn in Russian politics. As 
CARGC Paper 13 shows, what is often 
understood as the Primakov doctrine 
– a strategic pursuit of  multipolar 
internet governance through the 
United Nations system – can in fact 
be traced to Andrey Kozyrev’s tenure 
as Russia’s first Foreign Minister in the 
early 1990s, a time of  rapid economic 
liberalization and market reforms. By 
making central questions of  national 
sovereignty to our understanding of  
the digital, CARGC Paper 13 reflects 
the work of  our current research 
group on Critical Digital Sovereignties 
(2013 – 2023), a diverse group of  
global media scholars examining 
the changing meanings, ethics, and 
practices of  sovereignty in the digital 
age. 
CARGC Paper 13 offers an innovative 
analytical lens for making sense of  
Russia’s internet governance agenda 
by foregrounding the cultural logics 
that underpin its strategic approach. 
This cultural approach foregrounds 
the historical trope of  Russia as a 
great power to explain Russian elites’ 
rejection of  US-led unipolarity. It 
complicates dominant narratives by 
tracing Russia’s vision of  multipolarity 
to the early eighteenth century and 
anxieties about global recognition 
under Peter the Great’s reign. 
Methodologically, CARGC Paper 
13 shows how analytically centering 
cultural factors such as Russia’s 
great power identity generates more 
nuanced understandings of  the logics 
and rhetoric at play in states’ internet 
governance normative visions. This 
provides an interesting blueprint for 
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future internet governance research 
more attuned to cultural and socio-
historical dimensions of  digital policy. 
This past year, our research group 
on Critical Digital Sovereignties has 
been in full swing. On October 3, 
2019, we held a daylong workshop 
at our headquarters in Philadelphia 
to explore the question “What is 
Digital Sovereignty?” We invited 
scholars from Europe, Africa, and 
the US to reimagine sovereignty in 
and with the digital. Topics ranged 
from biometric data rights in India, 
the symbolism of  satellite dishes for 
the Islamic State, Grindr and military 
surveillance in China, alternative 
internet infrastructures in Indigenous 
communities in the US, Mexico, 
and the Gaza Strip. Participants 
submitted images, videos, or sound 
files along with their papers. This 
helped foreground the aural and visual 
dimensions of  how digital sovereignty 
is felt, experienced, circulated, and 
contested across various contexts. As 
an output of  the workshop, CARGC 
Press published a collaborative 
digital publication using the open-
source platform Scalar. This reflects 
the group’s focus on producing 
exciting research on the digital and 
desire to mobilize innovative digital 
methodologies and tools for doing 
so. The Scalar publication can be 
viewed at https://os.pennds.org/
digitaldominion/critical-digital-
sovereignties-/index or accessed from 
our website. I encourage you to check 
it out and explore sovereignty in the 
digital age from multiple angles, scales, 
locations, and perspectives. A perfect 
companion to CARGC Paper 13! 
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Toward a Cultural Framework of Internet 
Governance: Russia’s Great Power Identity 
and the Quest for a Multipolar Digital Order
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, Russia has promoted the primacy of  national governments and 
intergovernmental organizations in managing the global internet.1  On May 1, 2019, in 
a recent move toward Russia’s state-based internet governance vision, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin signed amendments to two federal laws, entitled On Communication and 
On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Security, establishing an autonomous 
internet infrastructure within Russia’s territory. The Sovereign Internet Law, as the 
initiative came to be known, prescribes duplicating some of  the global internet’s critical 
infrastructures, vastly expanding the state’s authorities over the internet, and ultimately 
allowing the Russian government to operate a national internet segment independent of  the 
global network (Epifanova 2020). Russian supporters of  the Sovereign Internet Law have 
framed it expressly in terms of  challenging the Western-dominated global digital order. The 
bill’s sponsors in the State Duma cited the “aggressive” 2018 US Cybersecurity Strategy, 
which identified Russia as one of  the US’ key adversaries (alongside North Korea and Iran), 
as evidence of  the need for technological self-sufficiency in a global digital system (Klishas, 
Bokova and Lugovoy 2018). In late December, nearly two months after the law went into 
effect, the Russian president at his annual meeting with the press defended the law against 
widespread domestic and international criticism that claimed it encroached on users’ 
human rights and sought to isolate Russia from the world. Putin argued, “[a] free internet 
and a sovereign internet are two concepts that are not mutually exclusive,” asserting that the 
law’s only goal was “to prevent the negative consequences of  Russia’s possible disconnection 
from the global network, which is largely governed from abroad” (Putin 2019b; added emphasis).2  
This CARGC Paper considers the cultural logics underlying Russia’s global internet 
governance agenda. It argues that to understand Russia’s digital vision in the early twenty-
first century and, by extension, the dynamics of  global internet politics writ large, scholars 
must incorporate Russia’s historic self-identification as a great power into their analyses. In 
the post-Cold War era, Russian political elites across the ideological spectrum have drawn 
on the cultural repertoire of  Russia as a great power to construct the state’s overarching 
geopolitical interest in reestablishing Russia’s full participation in global governance. 
Russia’s geopolitical desire to secure recognition as a great power with an inherent right 
to co-manage the international system hinges on the country’s belief  that the unipolar 
1 I would like to thank Clovis Bergere, Marina Krikorian, Fernanda Rosa, Britt Tevis, and Melissa Aronczyk for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 I rely on official translations of Russian-language statements into English where such documents are available; 
in all other cases, translations are mine. 
STANISLAV 
BUDNITSKY
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US-led liberal order, which emerged in the aftermath of  the Cold War, must be replaced 
with a multipolar order, in which multiple world powers negotiate the course of  global 
developments. The framework of  multipolarity has dominated Russia’s diplomatic discourse 
since the mid-1990s, promoting the notion of  state sovereignty as full dominion of  national 
governments in domestic affairs, respect for the diversity of  the world’s cultural and political 
systems, and global governance conducted through international law and multilateral 
intergovernmental organizations, primarily the UN Security Council. Russia views these 
pillars of  multipolarity as challenging US-led liberal internationalism, which violates 
principles of  national sovereignty and neglects global cultural and political diversity by 
imposing its will upon other societies.
The framework of  multipolarity came to the fore of  Russia’s worldview concurrently with 
the emergence of  the Russian internet governance agenda in the second half  the 1990s. 
Since then, the quest for multipolarity has underlain the normative principles and rhetoric 
of  Russia’s pursuit for a multipolar digital order. For this reason, I use digital multipolarity to 
refer to the condition of  a multipolar digital order that Russia works to instill and digital 
multipolarism to indicate Russia’s concerted agenda of  advancing this vision that encompasses 
rhetoric, institutions, and initiatives meant to challenge the US-led digital unipolarity. As 
in other realms, a digital multipolarism narrative promotes the normative tropes of  the 
primacy of  state sovereignty over national internet segments, the need to diversify global 
digital governance and markets monopolized by the United States, and of  the primacy of  
state-based intergovernmental venues in managing the global internet. 
This paper illuminates how Russia’s self-understanding as a great power and its multipolar 
vision have shaped its internet governance discourse by examining Russia’s early internet 
initiatives in the 1990s. By focusing on Russia’s internet governance policymaking predating 
Vladimir Putin’s presidency in 2000, this paper offers a corrective to the dominant 
understanding of  Russia’s internet agenda solely as the function of  Putin-era political 
authoritarianism and cultural illiberalism. Additionally, focusing on the cultural logics 
of  the nation’s approach to the global internet expands scholars’ analytical toolbox for 
understanding the workings of  global internet governance, since scholarship on the subject 
has privileged materialist, legal, and science and technology studies (STS) approaches. By 
contrast, this paper contributes to a nascent literature that takes ideational and cultural 
factors seriously in the study of  internet governance.    
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
This CARGC Paper is part of  a larger research project on the relationship between 
nationalism and global internet governance. Using a socio-historical lens, the project 
examines Russia’s approach to domestic and global internet governance in the context 
of  its official national identity trajectory across the three post-Soviet decades. The larger 
study draws from intertextual analysis of  Russia’s official identity and internet discourses; 
By focusing on Russia’s 
internet governance 
policymaking predating 
Vladimir Putin’s presidency 
in 2000, this paper offers 
a corrective to the dominant 
understanding of  Russia’s 
internet agenda solely as 
the function of  Putin-era 
political authoritarianism 
and cultural illiberalism.
Toward a Cultural Framework of Internet Governance: Russia’s Great 
Power Identity and the Quest for a Multipolar Digital Order
 CARGC PAPER 13 2020
 Annenberg School for Communication, University of  Pennsylvania 5
interviews with Russian media and internet experts and practitioners; and participant 
observation conducted at high-profile foreign policy and internet-related gatherings in 
Russia and four other countries. Its methods and findings underlie the following discussion, 
even as the present study does not explicitly incorporate ethnographic methods. To 
illustrate this paper’s main proposition regarding cultural continuities of  Russia’s digital 
multipolarism rooted in its great power self-image, I analyze the text and the socio-
political context surrounding one of  Russia’s earliest internet governance initiatives: 
the UN Resolution proposed in 1998, entitled Developments in the Field of  Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of  International Security (United Nations General Assembly 
1999). I then show how the logics and language of  this resolution have underlain Russia’s 
internet governance agenda to this day.                
This CARGC Paper proceeds in three steps. Part I contextualizes digital multipolarism 
within the global internet governance debate between proponents and opponents of  the 
US-led digital order and reviews existing scholarly understandings of  Russia’s internet 
governance agenda. Part II situates Russia’s digital multipolarism in relation to its historic 
great power identity, offering a cultural analysis of  Russia’s internet governance agenda. 
Part III illustrates how Russian officials have drawn on the ideational and discursive 
framework of  multipolarity in constructing Russia’s digital multipolarism through an 
examination of  Russia’s early internet governance initiatives in the 1990s. The conclusion 
discusses the limitations of  the prevailing non-cultural explanations of  Russia’s internet 
governance agenda.
RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNET 
Russia’s pursuit of  a multipolar digital order is one of  the structuring forces of  global 
internet politics and thus must be understood in the context of  geopolitical debates 
about the global internet. Accordingly, this section introduces the emergence of  internet 
governance as a geopolitical domain and explains its central debate over which state or non-
state organizations should hold the ultimate authority to govern the global internet. Further, 
the section situates Russia’s internet governance agenda within the clashing visions for the 
global internet advanced by national governments. Lastly, it reviews prevalent scholarly 
approaches to understanding Russia’s digital multipolarism.
Internet Governance: Emergence of a Geopolitical Domain
Global internet governance refers to the domain of  global politics concerned with the 
design and administration of  the norms and rules governing the global internet (DeNardis 
2014). Over the past two decades, internet governance ascended to the fore of  global 
communication policymaking and global affairs (Radu 2019). From the internet’s invention 
in the 1970s under the auspices of  the US government through its rapid popularization 
and commercialization in the mid-1990s, governance of  the internet’s critical infrastructure 
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was performed by several US-based non-profit organizations. In 1997-98, as the 
internet’s political-economic and security potential came to the fore, the Clinton White 
House moved to secure the United States’ historic privilege over the internet. The US 
administration fostered a governance model that preserved management of  the internet’s 
critical resources within existing and newly established US-based non-governmental 
organizations, while precluding from its management intergovernmental bodies (Mueller 
2002). The US government’s initiative introduced the central question of  global internet 
politics: should management of  the global internet’s critical resources continue to be 
controlled by unelected US-based bodies or should it be administered under the ambit of  
an intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations? Put another way, what 
governing arrangement would allow states other than the US to share power over the global 
internet’s techno-political configurations? While the central debate of  internet governance 
emerged at the close of  the twentieth century, it was not until the first decade of  the twenty-
first century that the central actors and institutions involved in this debate emerged on the 
global stage. 
In the 2000s, national governments became increasingly involved in managing their 
domestic internet segments and advancing their foreign policies of  the internet (Giacomello 
2005; Goldsmith and Wu 2006, Chap. 5; Mueller 2010). The UN World Summit on 
Information Society (WSIS), held in two phases in 2003 and 2005, brought together 
highest-level officials in discussions over how and who ought to govern the global internet 
for the first time, thereby elevating internet governance to unprecedented geopolitical 
heights (Mueller 2010, Chap. 3). The summit cemented the issue of  state versus non-
state-based governance of  the internet as the core problematic of  global internet politics, 
exposing cleavages among varying national visions. The terms of  this debate persist largely 
unchanged to this day and are reviewed next. 
National Agendas for the Global Internet
The United States as the digital hegemon works to preserve the existing internet governance 
model, which critically relies upon US-based non-governmental organizations (Powers 
and Jablonski 2015). A number of  traditional and new US allies support this agenda (e.g., 
Canada, Estonia, and Ukraine). Most European states have traditionally argued for a 
greater role in internet governance decision-making for national governments vis-à-vis 
non-governmental institutions, while reaffirming the shared Euro-Atlantic values in order 
to distance themselves from illiberal challengers to the US’ digital hegemony such as China 
and Russia (Buttarelli 2014). Particularly after the revelations of  Edward Snowden in 2013 
regarding the US unlawful global surveillance programs, European powers such as France 
and Germany have been increasingly vocal in promoting the rhetoric of  national and 
European digital sovereignty and have been more assertive in challenging the digital status 
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quo (e.g., French National Cybersecurity Agency 2016). At the UN Internet Governance 
Forum in Paris in 2018, the French President Emmanuel Macron criticized what he called 
the false binary structuring contemporary internet governance discourse: a choice between 
the “Californian” model of  undemocratic regulation by unelected private bodies and the 
“Chinese” model of  complete state control without meaningful participation of  non-state 
actors (Macron 2018). Macron proposed instead “a new multilateralism” that would bring 
together state and non-state actors in establishing new rules for the global internet.
Russia and China are the most prominent opponents of  the US-led system and proponents 
of  a multipolar digital order. Their counter-hegemonic narrative stresses the primacy of  
Westphalian state sovereignty as the normative underlying principle for global internet 
governance. This position holds that, as with preceding communication systems from the 
telegraph to television, national governments and national laws should guide domestic 
internet governance, while intergovernmental organizations and binding international laws 
should regulate the global internet.  
Since the late 2000s, advocates of  state-based governance have developed collective and 
individual institutions and initiatives that explicitly challenge the current digital order. 
One early example of  such a collective initiative is the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of  
International Information Security, signed in 2009 by members of  the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO; then consisting of  China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan), and expressing commitment to the “internationalization of  global internet 
governance.” The Agreement alludes to the United States and other technologically developed 
states when it names the “[u]se of  dominant position[s] in the information space to the 
detriment of  the interests and security of  other countries” as one of  the key threats to 
international informational security (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2009, 12). In a 
sign of  the recent institutionalization of  the Russia-led digital multipolarism, since 2015, 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) communication ministers have gathered 
annually, sometimes in conjunction with SCO members, to promote the internationalization 
of  internet governance and the global ICT market. At the 8th International IT Forum 
held in Russia, which brought together BRICS and SCO members and their national 
digital champions, the Russian Minister of  Communication Nikolay Nikiforov (2012-2018) 
lamented that the global IT market is “unfortunately, dominated essentially by one country 
and a few companies.” As an alternative, he proposed, “in all spheres we should have 
balance and diversification. Monopoly is bad. Monopoly in the information technologies is 
a real threat to the digital sovereignty of  our countries” (Nikiforov 2016).
Russia’s increasingly assertive global advancement of  a multipolar digital order has received 
ample attention from experts, who have generated several explanations of  Russia’s position 
and attendant policy initiatives. The next section reviews these explanations and then offers 
a cultural framework for understanding Russia’s approach to the global internet.  
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Scholarly Approaches to Russia’s Internet Governance Agenda  
The dominant view of  Russia’s global push for a state-based internet governance model 
deems it an extension of  domestic authoritarian politics and variously conceptualizes 
it as “networked authoritarianism,” “digital authoritarianism,” and “Moscow’s spoiler 
model” (Franke and Pallin 2012, 62-64; Kennedy 2013; Maréchal 2017; Morgus 2018a; 
Mueller 2019, 8-10; O’Hara and Hall 2018; Polatin-Reuben and Wright 2014; Soldatov 
and Borogan 2015, Chap. 11; Stadnik 2019). This school of  thought views Russia’s policy 
proposals as an effort to export its domestic authoritarian model in order to normalize the 
Russian ruling elite’s political repressions and personal enrichment at home. By contrast, 
Julian Nocetti, a leading observer of  Russia’s internet politics, argues against viewing 
internet governance debates and Russia’s approach to them specifically through the binary 
lens of  democratic versus authoritarian regimes. While acknowledging Russia’s opposition 
to the US internet hegemony, Nocetti suggests that the conflict instead is taking place 
“between long-established, cosmopolitan states and newer states that do not yet feel safe in 
their sovereignty” (2015, 129). Nocetti places Russia’s origins in the moment of  its formal 
independence from the Soviet Union in December 1991, thereby determining Russia to 
be a new state. As a newer nation-state not yet confident in its sovereignty, according to 
Nocetti’s framework, Russia seeks to erect digital borders out of  a sense of  ontological 
insecurity. Another common scholarly approach to conceptualizing Russia’s current 
advocacy of  state-based internet governance situates Russia’s internet agenda within the 
political-economic rise of  a cohort of  states around the world, including but not limited 
to BRICS, and their ensuing challenge to the US-led digital status quo (Ebert and Maurer 
2013; Freedman and Wilkinson 2013; Rebello 2017; Winseck 2017; Zhao 2015). As middle 
and major powers not aligned with the United States gain geopolitical weight, these writers 
suggest, they seek to reshape the norms and infrastructures of  the global internet: from 
laying new submarine internet cables to putting forth collective internet policy initiatives.    
Generally, existing analytical approaches to Russia’s internet governance vision do not 
consider Russian national identity as a legible explanatory factor of  its normative stance. 
This neglect of  the cultural lens in understanding the logics of  Russian internet philosophy 
is symptomatic of  a broader omission in internet governance scholarship. In thinking about 
the structuring dynamics of  internet governance as a global domain, to date, scholars 
have privileged the lenses of  law, political economy, international relations, and science 
and technology studies (e.g., Brousseau et al. 2012; Carr 2015; Kohl 2017; Musiani et al. 
2016). Socio-cultural approaches to global internet governance have remained marginal, 
particularly those employing a national identity lens (but see Kiggins 2012). To fill this 
analytical gap, scholars must take into account cultural factors when conceptualizing 
Russia’s approach to global internet politics. 
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How national decision-making elites conceptualize the nation’s identity, drawing in this 
process from the cultural reservoir available to their society at a given historical moment, 
informs the state’s construction of  its foreign policy interest and performance on the world 
stage. As Erik Ringmar notes in his study of  the relationship between national identity and 
geopolitical action, “in order to answer a question regarding an interest we must first be able 
to answer a question regarding who or what we are” (Ringmar 1996, 13). Russian ruling 
elite’s answer to the question of  who Russia is—a great power—has not fundamentally 
changed since the early eighteenth century, despite dramatic changes to the country’s 
political regime. The analytical approach I adopt to the relationship between Russia’s great 
power identity and pursuit of  digital multipolarity seeks to establish what has been referred 
to as “constitutive causality” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 52). The lens of  constitutive 
causality “engages how humans conceive of  their worlds, the language they use to describe 
them, and other elements constituting that social world, which make possible or impossible 
the interactions they pursue” rather than trying to establish the relationship between 
cultural context and action “in terms of  a more mechanistic causality” (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow 2012, 52). The next section thereby situates Russia’s digital multipolarity narrative 
in relation to its historic great power identity in order to illuminate the cultural context 
informing Russia’s construction of  its interest in the area of  global internet governance. 
DIGITAL MULTIPOLARISM AND GREAT POWER IDENTITY
Russia’s historic national identity as a great power, this paper contends, underlies its digital 
multipolarism – a geopolitical agenda to replace the US-led internet governance system 
with a state-based intergovernmental arrangement. This section unpacks what great power 
identity means in contemporary Russian political imaginary. I first historicize Russia’s claims 
to great power status over the past three centuries to illuminate why this cultural repertoire 
was so readily available for the Russian post-Soviet policymaking elites to embrace as 
the crux of  independent Russia’s national project. I then explain why the concept of  
multipolarity, in turn, is central to Russia’s self-understanding as a great power. Lastly, I 
detail the tropes that form the ideational and discursive framework of  multipolarism and by 
extension of  digital multipolarism.
Russia’s great power identity has informed the logics and discourse of  Russian official 
nationalism and foreign policy since the early eighteenth century. Identity is an 
intersubjective category and social actors, individuals and states alike, seek recognition of  
their self-understanding from significant others (Bartelson 2016). Countries of  Western 
Europe and, since the twentieth century, the Euro-Atlantic world led by the United States 
have historically played the role of  Russia’s significant other, from whom Russian elites 
sought recognition (Neumann 2016a; Tolz 2001, Chap. 3). Beginning in the late fifteenth 
century and throughout the seventeenth century, Russian elites strove for recognition of  
Russia as an equal European power (Neumann 2008a). Western royals, however, deemed 
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Russia’s Eastern Orthodoxy and despotic governance to be culturally alien, leaving Russia 
on the symbolic periphery of  Europe until Peter the Great’s (1682-1725) full-fledged 
campaign to attain great power status. Domestically, Peter attempted to Europeanize the 
country’s cultural norms and administrative practices. Abroad, he asserted Russia’s place in 
Europe through diplomacy and war. Following Russia’s defeat of  Sweden, then a top-rated 
power, in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), the newly created Russian Empire received 
recognition as a key actor in the international system. Three decades later, during the Seven 
Years’ War (1756-1763), the world’s major powers finally awarded Russia long-sought 
recognition as an undisputed great power. 
Russia affirmed its great power status during the so-called long nineteenth century, a period 
between the French (1789) and Russian (1917) revolutions (Neumann 2008b). During 
this time, Russia participated in the creation of  the modern global telecommunication 
order. It was one of  the twenty founding states of  the International Telegraph Union in 
1865 and one of  the twenty-nine founders of  the International Radiotelegraph Union 
in 1906 (the two organizations ultimately merged to become in 1947 the International 
Telecommunication Union under the auspices of  the UN). During the Soviet period (1922-
1991), despite the ideological break with the Orthodox monarchy of  the Russian Empire, 
Russian rulers continued to seek Western recognition of  its great power status (Ringmar 
2002). 
After the USSR’s dissolution, Russian political elites across the ideological spectrum were 
primed to view great power status as Russia’s raison d’être (Clunan 2014; Lo 2002, 19-20). 
Representatives of  political factions, however, have held different visions of  the sources of  
Russia’s greatness. A leading scholar of  Russian foreign policy Andrei Tsygankov (2016) 
identifies three ideational strands among Russian foreign policymakers since at least the 
sixteenth century: Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists. In the post-Soviet period, 
Westernizers saw the source of  Russia’s greatness in shared liberal-democratic values and 
sought integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Westernizers’ influence on Russia’s 
foreign policy was particularly strong during Boris Yeltsin’s first presidential term (1991-
1996), although during this time Russia’s official stance increasingly slid toward centrist 
statism. Statists, who range from liberal to conservative wings, equate greatness with a strong 
state that can maintain domestic economic and political order and ensure security from 
external threats. Statists are not inherently anti-Western but seek recognition of  Russia’s 
sovereignty as a prerequisite to pragmatic cooperation. The statist period began with the 
term of  Yevgeny Primakov as the Foreign Minister (1996-98) and Prime Minister (1998-
99) and continued throughout much of  Vladimir Putin’s rule until the early 2010s. Lastly, 
Civilizationists emphasize Russia’s cultural distinctiveness and most assertively challenge 
Western liberalism. Civilizational tropes began appearing in Russia’s official discourse 
toward the late 2000s and became overt following the regime’s conservative turn of  2012-
14. 
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As in the previous epochs, in the post-Soviet period elite debates have been not so much 
about whether Russia is a great power but, rather, what kind of  great power it is or ought 
to be in terms of  its geopolitical orientation and sources of  greatness. Acknowledging the 
plurality of  competing elite understandings of  the essence of  Russia’s great power identity, 
Director of  Moscow’s Carnegie Center Dmitri Trenin points out the ambiguities of  
Russia’s great power identity discourse (Trenin 2011, 411-417; see also Morozov 2015, 59). 
Nevertheless, Trenin suggests that Russian elites of  varying ideological persuasions concur 
upon the view that “strategic independence” is fundamental to Russia’s greatness (see also 
Lo 2002, 57-61). According to Trenin, strategic independence for Russian elites implies that 
Russia inherently enjoys the right to domestic sovereignty, free pursuit of  interests abroad, 
and full participation in global governance. Russia’s pursuit of  strategic independence in 
the post-bipolar international environment led to the emergence of  multipolarity as the 
central ideational and discursive framework of  Russia’s foreign policy (Ambrosio 2005; 
Chebankova 2017; Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2017; Silvius 2017). The notion of  polarity 
in international affairs originates in the US realist school of  international relations theory 
and refers to the relative distribution of  material capacities, most crucially economic and 
military, among one (unipolarity), two (bipolarity), or multiple (multipolarity) great powers 
at any given historic moment (Keersmaeker 2017). Having borrowed the terminology of  
polarity from the realist Western academic discourse, Russian officials employ multipolarity 
as a normative proposition about the nature of  Russian identity as a great power and the 
post-Cold War international system, which, they argue, should be governed by several 
centers of  power, including Russia. 
The foundational principles and tropes of  Russia’s official multipolarity discourse have 
remained virtually unchanged since the early-to-mid 1990s. The basis of  multipolarity, 
as used in Russian official discourse, is the sanctity of  Westphalian state sovereignty. The 
sovereign has full authority over domestic conduct within its territory and full independence 
from foreign interference. The tropes of  “sovereignty” and “independence” refer to the 
inalienable right of  governments to pursue domestic and foreign policy they see fit. Putin 
highlighted the existential significance of  sovereignty for Russia at the Valdai Club meeting 
in 2007: “[s]overeignty is […] something very precious today, something exclusive, you 
could even say. Russia cannot exist without defending its sovereignty. Russia will either be 
independent and sovereign or will most likely not exist at all” (Putin 2007). The principle of  
sovereignty is then applied globally to suggest that the world is or ought to be comprised of  
sovereign states free to conduct themselves domestically and internationally in accordance 
with their respective cultural, social, and political beliefs and identities. The notion that 
the world consists of  multiple distinct sovereigns is conveyed with the trope of  “diversity.” 
Diversity is juxtaposed against the “hegemony” or “monopoly” of  the US-led order, 
even when the United States are not explicitly mentioned by name and referred to via 
euphemisms like “one country” and “sole power.” 
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Russia offers a two-pronged argument in favor of  multipolarity. The first argument appeals 
to moral categories by framing a multipolar world as more “democratic,” “equitable,” and 
“just,” since it allegedly gives every sovereign people the right to live according to their 
cultural beliefs and political ideologies. The second argument appeals to the purported 
greater efficiency of  a multipolar world in which the powerful unipole does not skew the 
rules of  the global economic competition and political deliberations. “International law” 
and state-based “multilateral governance,” foremost the United Nations and its Security 
Council, are proposed as the mechanisms through which the multipolar world 
should function.  
Russia’s multipolarity discourse has continuously relied on the same set of  tropes but has 
acquired an increasingly confrontational tone with the gradual shift in Russia’s identity 
discourse toward greater illiberalism over the course of  three post-Soviet decades (Neumann 
2016b). Illustrative of  the Kremlin’s ideational and rhetorical pivot toward anti-Westernism 
in the 2010s, in his annual address to the upper house of  the Russian parliament in 
December 2017, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (2004 – present) harshly blamed 
Western powers for the ongoing crisis in Russia-West relations and chastised them for their 
opposition to the emergence of  the multipolar world:
We are convinced that the main reason for the current tension is the persistently 
egocentric and cynical line taken by a number of  countries, led by the United 
States. Having come to believe in its own supremacy and infallibility, and having 
become accustomed to thinking its opinions should be perceived as the ultimate 
truth, the so-called “historical West” is trying to obstruct the natural process of  the 
development of  a more just and democratic polycentric world order. Those who 
dissent are subjected to a broad range of  reprisals, unilateral coercive measures 
and direct interference in their internal affairs (Lavrov 2017).
Russian officials have drawn on the ideational and discursive framework of  multipolarity, 
a core pillar of  Russia’s great power identity, in constructing Russia’s counter-hegemonic 
narrative of  global internet governance. The next section examines the emergence of  this 
discourse in the 1990s.  
THE ORIGINS OF DIGITAL MULTIPOLARISM
Yevgeny Primakov is widely considered to have made the pursuit of  multipolarity the 
central tenet of  Russia’s foreign policy during his tenure as the second Foreign Minister in 
1996-98 and Prime Minister in 1998-99 (Ambrosio 2005, 166; Lo 2015, 43-44; Makarychev 
and Morozov 2011, 355; Silvius 2017, 82). During Primakov’s final years, but especially 
after his passing in 2015 at the age of  eighty-five, official Russian discourse mythologized 
the figure of  Primakov as the founding father of  post-Soviet Russia’s foreign policy. In late 
October 2019, on the anniversary of  Primakov’s ninetieth birthday, the unveiling of  his life-
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size monument outside of  the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs definitively propelled Primakov to 
the status of  the progenitor of  modern Russia’s foreign policy with multipolarism at its core. 
In his remarks at the ceremony, Putin commended Primakov for having revived respect 
for Russia in international diplomacy, suggesting that Primakov “had a strategic vision 
and worked hard to promote the idea of  multipolarity. In fact, it was Yevgeny Primakov 
who clearly formulated the key principles of  the modern world development. We see that 
multipolarity is no longer a trend but a reality today” (Putin 2019a).
While it was Primakov who first promoted multipolarism as a foreign policy doctrine, 
he drew upon ideational and discursive foundations found in Boris Yeltsin’s first term 
as president (1991-1996) and Andrey Kozyrev’s tenure as Russia’s first Foreign Minister 
(1990-1996).3 To illuminate continuity between administrations, I trace Russia’s digital 
multipolarity discourse through the first half  of  the 1990s, even as the internet reached 
less than one percent of  the population and internet geopolitics were nascent. By making 
evident the degree of  ideational continuity between twinned discourses of  great power and 
multipolarity from Kozyrev’s liberal Atlanticism to Primakov’s centrist statism, I challenge 
analytical couplings of  Russia’s rejection of  the US digital hegemony with authoritarian 
politics and purported anti-Western phobias of  Putin’s regime. 
Russia as a Normal Great Power: 1991-1996 
Examining the essentially pre-internet years of  the early 1990s is critical for understanding 
the cultural logics of  Russia’s approach to the global internet. The Russian government in 
the first years after the demise of  the Soviet Union enthusiastically pursued Euro-Atlantic 
orientation toward cultural and institutional integration into the liberal West (Tsygankov 
2016, Chap. 3). Russian leaders insisted, however, that the Euro-Atlantic integration would 
not diminish the country’s great power status but enhance it by returning Russia to the 
common civilizational path characterized by a liberal-democratic political system and 
market economy. Andrey Kozyrev, writing in the US magazine Foreign Affairs a few months 
after the Soviet Union’s demise, asserted that “Russia will not cease to be a great power. But 
it will be a normal great power” (Kozyrev 1992). The trope of  a nation’s return to normality 
of  the civilized Western world from the alleged abnormality of  state socialism is one of  the 
central propositions of  the so-called transition, a liberal teleological narrative suggesting that 
societies necessarily move toward market liberalism, while any deviation from this path is a 
temporary accident of  history (Kennedy 2002). Kozyrev’s emphasis on Russia being a normal 
great power, then, was meant to signal a qualitative shift in Russia’s great power self-image 
toward that of  a non-threatening equal partner of  the West that was firmly on the way to 
joining the family of  liberal democracies.  
3 Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (RSSR, then still part of the USSR) in June 
1991 and continued serving as Russian president after the Soviet Union’s end and through his reelection for the 
second term in 1996. Kozyrev was appointed Foreign Minister of the RSSR by the parliament in October 1990 and 
likewise carried on in this role into Russia’s independence.  
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Russian elites’ belief  that as a great power Russia could not be subservient to the emergent 
US-led unipolarity inspired Russia’s vision of  multipolarity. Within the first two years of  
Russia’s post-Soviet independence, the early naiveté of  the Russian liberal foreign policy 
decision-makers regarding Russia’s place in the West gave way to increasing skepticism 
about the prospects of  seamless integration. Kozyrev, still a convinced Atlanticist, wrote in 
Foreign Affairs two years later to call upon Western audiences for “partnership in a multipolar 
world” while explicitly denouncing the emerging US hegemony:     
[T]he international order in the 21st century will not be a Pax Americana or any 
other version of  unipolar or bipolar dominance. The United States does not have 
the capability to rule alone. Russia, while in a period of  transitional difficulties, 
retains the inherent characteristics of  a great power (technology, resources, 
weaponry). And other rising centers of  influence strive for a greater role in world 
affairs. The nature of  modern international problems calls for solutions on a 
multilateral level (Kozyrev 1994).
Russia’s great power identity and multipolarity vision was institutionalized in its first 
Foreign Policy Concept developed during the peak of  Russia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation 
throughout 1992 and signed into law by Yeltsin in early 1993. The Concept exhibits 
fervent commitment to a market economy and liberal democracy yet also asserts Russia’s 
natural great power status and showcases multipolarism’s foundational normative tropes: 
independence in foreign policy, opposition to unipolarity, and primacy of  international law 
and multilateral institutions in global governance. The Concept argues, “it is necessary to 
firmly resist the USA’s possible relapses into a policy of  imperial ambitions, or any attempt 
to embark on a policy of  turning the USA into a ‘sole superpower’” (Yeltsin 2005 [1993]). 
At the same time, the Concept reaffirms Russia’s commitment to transition and portrays 
the United States as Russia’s most favored significant other by suggesting, for instance, that 
in US-Russia relations “[t]he top priority is to have America acknowledge Russia’s leading 
role as the engine for market reform and guarantor of  democratic transition within the 
post-Soviet space.” The coexistence within a single discourse of  the argument against US 
hegemony and yearning for recognition of  Russia’s liberal credentials by the US suggests 
that Russia’s multipolarism is not inherently culturally illiberal and politically authoritarian, 
as is often assumed from today’s analytical vantage point. Rather, opposition to the US 
hegemony and advocacy of  the UN-based multipolarity stems from Russia’s understanding 
of  itself  as a great power with an inalienable right to co-manage the international system. 
The West did not embrace Russia as an equal partner in global affairs during what was, by 
far, Russia’s most pro-Western period in history. Consequently, by the end of  Yeltsin’s first 
term in 1996, official discourse of  open-armed Atlanticism of  the first post-Soviet years 
graduated toward a more statist self-image and an understanding of  Russia’s international 
interests as laying in pragmatic cooperation with the West rather than attempts at ideational 
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alignment. A few months before the presidential elections in the summer of  1996, Yeltsin 
appointed then head of  the Foreign Intelligence Service Yevgeny Primakov as 
Foreign Minister.  
Primakov Doctrine and the Emergence of Global Internet Politics: 1996-
1999   
Primakov during his terms as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister placed the notion 
of  multipolarity at the center of  Russia’s foreign policy, what came to be known as 
the Primakov Doctrine. In the second half  of  the 1990s, promotion of  the idea of  a 
multipolar world became a central task of  Russia’s foreign policy in its quest toward global 
recognition of  its great power status. While the Kremlin did not update the 1993 Foreign 
Policy Concept during Primakov’s tenure, the framework of  multipolarism was anchored 
throughout political and policy discourse. For example, the 1997 National Security Concept 
suggested that Russia’s interests “require active foreign policy aimed at strengthening 
Russia’s positions as a great power – one of  the influential centers in the emerging 
multipolar world” (Yeltsin 2002 [1997], 55). On the global stage, Russia inaugurated 
multipolarism with the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the 
Establishment of  a New International Order (Yeltsin and Zemin 1997). 
Concurrent with the institutionalization of  Russia’s multipolarism discourse, the global 
politics of  the internet were forming as a geopolitical domain with a distinct set of  actors, 
issues, and institutions (Braman 2004). The framework of  multipolarity had underpinned 
Russia’s approach to the global internet from the beginning of  its participation in early 
global internet governance politics. In 1998, Russia inaugurated the UN discussion on 
security in the global informational space by submitting a two-page resolution, entitled 
Developments in the Field of  Information and Telecommunications in the Context of  International Security, 
to the General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly, 1999). The document draws 
attention to the potential use of  emerging scientific-technological innovations toward 
improper ends and calls on UN member states to collectively respond to this inherent 
challenge of  the digital age. Since 1998, Russia has put forth the resolution nearly 
every year.  
The resolution has contributed to institutionalization of  internet governance as a domain 
of  global affairs and, in line with Russia’s digital multipolarism agenda, to the symbolic 
legitimization of  intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations as venues 
for internet governance deliberations. Since its introduction, the UN has published annual 
collections of  states’ replies to the resolution, which became a regular platform for states to 
express their normative positions on international information security. Most significantly, 
the resolution produced the UN Group of  Governmental Experts (GGE), a preeminent 
intergovernmental forum for discussing international information security. GGE processes 
are yearlong consultations among representatives of  roughly one to two dozen states on the 
norms of  international information security. The overarching purpose of  these face-to-face 
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discussions is to enhance mutual understanding among policymakers and ultimately come 
to an agreement on norms of  state behavior in cyberspace that would be acceptable to all 
governments involved in this process. The first four GGE processes (2004/05, 2009/10, 
2012/13, 2014/15) produced three consensus reports (2010, 2013, 2015) that contributed 
to building understanding among policymakers with contrasting normative stances, even 
if  they otherwise didn’t produce major tangible results. After a decade of  gradual progress, 
however, GGE imploded.
Against the backdrop of  the ongoing crisis in Russia-West relations, the fifth GGE in 
2016/17 exposed irreconcilable differences in countries’ normative approaches to the 
foundational principles of  internet governance. For example, in the 2017 annual collection 
of  states’ replies published by the UN Secretary-General, US ally Canada argued that 
“[e]xisting international law is applicable to the use of  information and communications 
technology by States” (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2017, 7-9). Canada’s 
proposition was counter to Russia’s long-standing insistence that new binding laws be 
developed through intergovernmental organizations to regulate states’ use of  ICT (an 
approach that Russia’s digital multipolarism frames as a more democratic mechanism 
of  regulating global informational space since it would presumably involve all states). In 
contrast with Canada, Cuba echoed Russia’s stance by arguing for the need “to establish 
a legally binding international regulatory framework which is complementary to existing 
international law but applies to information and communications technologies” (United 
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2017, 7-9). The 2016/17 GGE not only failed to 
produce a new consensus report but led to a split into two parallel cybersecurity discussion 
processes under the UN auspices: one initiated by the United States, another by Russia.  
Since the resolution’s introduction in the late 1990s, it has come to play a major symbolic 
role in Russian internet governance discourse. Russian officials have viewed the resolution 
as one of  the country’s most successful internet governance initiatives and have rhetorically 
employed it to promote the image of  Russia as an internet governance pioneer. The status 
of  a pioneer is meant to confer upon Russia a sense of  historical credibility to spearhead the 
reshaping of  the global digital order. Russian representatives regularly invoke the resolution 
as evidence of  widespread international support for the Kremlin’s internet governance 
agenda. In 2015, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (2012-2020) referenced it in his address 
to the World Internet Conference in China. Medvedev sought to bolster the multilateral 
internet governance model and criticize the US internet hegemony by noting that “support 
for the resolution has become truly global” with “more than 80 states from all regions of  the 
world” acting as its “coauthors” (Medvedev 2015). In 2018, on the twentieth anniversary 
of  the original resolution, the Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs issued a press release to 
celebrate the adoption of  the 2018 version of  the resolution. The press release was used on 
this occasion to bolster Russia’s internet governance stance by serving as a reminder that the 
“issue of  international security was placed on the UN’s agenda in 1998 at Russia’s initiative” 
and boasting that again in 2018 the resolution was “supported by an overwhelming majority 
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of  states and co-authored by over 30 countries from different parts of  the world” (Russian 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 2018). The press release framed Russia’s resolution as advancing 
an inherently more just multipolar order that would incorporate all countries into global 
internet governance on an equal footing, not only those aligned with the liberal hegemon: 
We are convinced that the era of  “club” arrangements is over and that all 
countries, regardless of  their level of  technological development, have a right to 
take a direct part in talks on [international information security] at the UN and to 
influence the decision-making process. Every vote counts and must be taken into 
consideration. Only in this way can we create the basis for a fair and equal world 
order in the digital sphere (Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 2018).
Having situated the resolution in the history of  global internet governance and in Russia’s 
political imaginary, I now return to the discussion of  the original resolution put forth in 
1998. I analyze it as an early example of  Russia’s digital multipolarism – a geopolitical 
agenda aimed at challenging the purported US digital hegemony and establishing in its 
place a digital order governed by multiple actors through intergovernmental organizations 
such as the United Nations. In the rest of  this section, I excavate elements of  Russia’s digital 
multipolarism in the resolution’s text (normative propositions advanced in the body of  the 
document) and context (socio-political circumstances pertaining to the original resolution’s 
introduction). By locating core pillars of  Russia’s digital multipolarism in the first post-
Soviet decade, I illuminate continuities in Russia’s approach to the global internet in order 
to analytically divorce Russia’s internet governance agenda from the logics of  authoritarian 
politics of  the Putin-era, which is currently the predominant way of  understanding Russia’s 
internet vision among Western scholars and media. By contrast, I demonstrate how the 
cultural logics of  Russian elites’ historic understanding of  Russia as a great power have 
underlain Russia’s quest to reinstate itself  as one of  the several geopolitical poles responsible 
for world governance, including management of  the global internet. 
The choice of  the United Nations as a venue for advancing the resolution signals Russian 
digital multipolarism’s core view of  intergovernmental fora as the main mechanism for 
global decision-making. While emphasizing the UN’s centrality to the management of  
global affairs, Russia since the early 1990s has advocated reforming the UN to better reflect 
post-Cold War realities and to attain greater efficiency. It was explicitly in the context of  
proposing such reforms to the UN that Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (1998-2004) introduced 
the resolution on international information security to the UN General Assembly:
I should like to reaffirm that we support the implementation of  reforms and 
changes in United Nations mechanisms that will promote effective consolidation 
of  the United Nations and improve its activities. Among the steps taken to that end 
I wish to mention adoption, under United Nations auspices, of  the Statute of  the 
International Criminal Court. Russia’s initiative to launch a discussion on ways to achieve 
international information security serves the same goal. In essence, our proposal is intended 
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to offset threats inherent in the use of  the latest advances in science and technology 
for purposes incompatible with the maintenance of  international security (Ivanov 
1998, 23; added emphasis).
Aside from Russia’s preference for an intergovernmental body as a venue for internet 
governance policymaking, continuity in its digital multipolarism is exemplified by the 
resolution’s focus on security and, relatedly, the fact that Russia was advancing the document 
via the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Russia’s discursive 
and policy emphasis on security in the context of  internet governance is often seen as a 
sign of  the government’s authoritarian illiberal politics of  the past decade (e.g., Pigman 
2019). Indeed, beginning in the early 2010s, Russian officials have increasingly narrated 
internet technology itself  as a threat to the political regime and society (Asmolov 2015). In 
2014, amid a wave of  government-initiated restrictive internet regulations, Putin famously 
suggested that the internet had been created as “a special CIA project” that was “still 
developing as such” (Putin 2014). The primacy of  security concerns within Russia’s foreign 
policy imaginary, however, is not exclusive to Putin’s rule, as security issues dominated 
Russia’s foreign policy agenda throughout Yeltsin’s presidency in 1991-99 (Lo 2002, 128-
144; Sergunin 2015, 135-153). As a self-identified great power, Russia wanted to be included 
in the construction of  the post-Cold War global security architecture. However, Russian 
leadership felt that, contrary to its expectations in the early 1990s, the West excluded Russia 
from this process. The exclusion was manifested most overtly in NATO’s plans to expand 
into Eastern Europe against Russia’s vehement opposition. Driven by the intense desire for 
inclusion into the security process and pursuing restoration of  its global prestige, Russia 
supported and initiated security arrangements outside of  the US-led structures (Lo 2002, 
132-134). Russia’s concern with international information security and its advancement 
through the UN, then, illuminates how Russia’s great power imaginary has continuously 
informed the logics of  digital multipolarism.
The timing of  the original resolution’s introduction provides further insight into continuities 
of  Russian digital multipolarism. Russia introduced the resolution to the UN General 
Assembly in late September 1998, one month after the financial collapse of  the Russian 
economy. The cabinet of  ministers that presided over the economic default resigned in 
August 1998 and Primakov was promoted from foreign minister to prime minister just 
over a week before the UN gathering. Remarks delivered to the UN General Assembly 
by Primakov’s successor as foreign minister, Igor Ivanov pursued two goals. The first was 
to assuage Western fears about Russia’s illiberal turn following the popular and political 
backlash against the country’s authorities after the financial crisis. The second was to 
promote the principle of  multipolarity in global affairs. Ivanov bridged the two imperatives 
in his speech: 
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From this rostrum I pledge that Russia will not deviate from the path of  reform and 
will do its best to pass with dignity this most difficult test, so as not only to preserve 
the democratic progress that has been made but also to augment it. Likewise, 
Russia’s foreign policy will remain consistent and constructive. It is firmly geared 
towards building a democratic multipolar world (Ivanov 1998, 20).
Russia rationalizes multipolarity as a more democratic form of  global order as compared to 
unipolarity, a system in which the US hegemon imposes its will upon others. Russia draws 
on the legitimacy of  democracy as a universal value in domestic governance to challenge the 
global liberal order spearheaded by the West and, in Russia’s view, to the diminishment of  
Russia’s role in global governance. In this case, Ivanov employs this rhetorical equation to 
allege that Russia’s domestic progress toward Western liberal democracy and the nature 
of  multipolarity that Russia advances are “democratic” in the same way. The adverb 
“likewise” connects these two propositions, further emphasizing that multipolarity in 
global affairs is equivalent to liberal democracy in domestic governance in terms of  its 
inclusive representative nature. What Ivanov’s remarks reveal about Russia’s quest for a 
multipolar order is that not only does this program precede what is generally viewed as 
Russia’s authoritarian turn in the 2000s and especially 2010s, but that it coincides with 
Russia’s strong commitment to liberalism professed from the main international podium. 
Further, the fact that Ivanov was promoting multipolarity immediately following one of  the 
worst economic blows in Russia’s Post-Soviet history suggests that Russia’s advancement 
of  multipolarity cannot be tied solely to its growing geopolitical ambitions over the course 
of  the 2000s. To sum up, today’s commonplace equation of  Russia’s advancement of  a 
multipolar digital order exclusively with the Kremlin’s authoritarianism or its growing 
political-economic weight are equally ahistorical and reductive.  
In addition to contextual factors outlined above, the resolution’s short text promotes digital 
multipolarism through its advancement of  a state-based intergovernmental vision of  global 
informational governance. The document frames information and telecommunication 
sphere as a global public good by suggesting that it furthers the “development of  
civilization,” creates opportunities for the “common good of  all States,” enhances the 
“creative potential of  mankind,” and improves the “circulation of  information in the global 
community.” All of  these terms – civilization, common good, all states, mankind, global 
community – appeal to the sense of  shared destiny that should be steered by a wide range of  
actors representative of  global diversity. Accordingly, since the late 1990s, Russia’s narration 
of  the global network has appealed to the internet’s communal origin myth to advance the 
core proposition of  digital mutlipolarism, i.e. that the digital status quo under the US ambit 
monopolizes the technology that was meant to benefit all, and that its management needs 
to be diversified. Igor Shchegolev, Minister of  Communication (2008-2012) and Aide to 
President (2012-2018), lamented in 2015 at the VI Safe Internet Forum held in Moscow:
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[D]e facto and de jure the global internet infrastructure and its governance are 
currently monopolized and are outside of  the international law.
[…] A turning point, however, is approaching. More and more people are starting 
to realize that the internet in its current state doesn’t reflect the objectives, for 
which it was created. It is upon us to return to the forefront the objective of  
mankind’s humanitarian development (Shchegolev 2015).
Lastly, the resolution calls on the international community to employ state-based 
“multilateral levels” of  governance and develop legally binding “international principles” 
to protect humanity’s digital progress and security. In the following two decades, Russia 
has continued to promote these two governance instruments as critical to challenging the 
US internet hegemony and restoring the internet to its purported original purpose. In his 
address to the 2009 Russian Internet Forum, President Medvedev (2008-2012) proposed, 
“the Internet should not be an environment dominated by rules set by one country alone, 
even the strongest and most advanced country. There should be international rules drawn 
up through collective effort, and the worldwide web should continue to develop as it has 
done so far – as a common environment” (Medvedev 2009).
Russian officials’ uninterrupted framing of  the internet as that of  a common good and of  
state-based governance mechanisms as best fitting the internet’s shared nature – as opposed 
to unilateral decision-making by the US digital hegemon – illuminate continuity in Russia’s 
digital multipolarism rooted in its great power self-image. 
CONCLUSION
This CARGC Paper explored the cultural logics underpinning the Russian state’s agenda 
to move the global internet’s governance away from the present model, which is dominated 
by the US-based non-governmental organizations, toward a state-based intergovernmental 
model under the auspices of  the United Nations. I have argued that Russia’s approach 
can be productively understood by employing Russia’s historic great power identity as the 
central analytical lens. In constructing independent Russia’s identity and interests, Russian 
ruling elites have drawn on the cultural repertoire of  Russia as a great power. Through 
this understanding, Russia sees full participation in global governance as its natural right 
and seeks to restore its place among the world’s leading powers following partial loss of  its 
status in the aftermath of  the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The emerging US-led unipolar 
liberal order of  the 1990s was incongruent with Russia’s understanding of  the international 
system and its place in it because it limited Russia’s domestic sovereignty and its role in 
shaping the global order. Consequently, Russia has advanced the normative framework 
of  multipolarism, centered around notions of  state sovereignty and global governance via 
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intergovernmental organizations and bodies, foremost the United Nations and its Security 
Council. This framework has informed the logics and language of  Russia’s global internet 
governance agenda, which I proposed to conceptualize as digital multipolarism.      
Using an identity-based analytical approach to Russia’s internet governance agenda, this 
paper focused on Russia’s internet policymaking in the first post-Soviet decade prior to 
Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. This analytically delimited timeline allowed me to illuminate 
continuities in Russia’s digital vision over the past two decades and to offer a corrective to 
dominant expert understandings of  Russia’s challenge to the US-led digital order. By far 
the most common scholarly explanation attributes Russia’s internet governance philosophy 
and policy to the country’s authoritarian political system and imperialist foreign policy. 
Scholars advancing this argument tend to focus on Russian politics in the 2010s, during 
Russia’s illiberal turn and severe crisis in the Russia-West relations. They purport that Russia 
challenges the US-led digital governance in order to bolster domestic repressions and enrich 
the elites. However, my examination of  Russia’s advancement of  digital multipolarity in 
the late 1990s, when Russia was still proclaiming its commitment to the liberal-democratic 
path and was considered a democracy by the Western community, shows this common 
understanding to be ahistorical. This paper’s cultural lens does not deny the corrupt and 
increasingly authoritarian nature of  Russia’s political system. Rather, it illuminates how 
long-standing cultural self-identification and attendant tropes necessarily inform this 
regime’s understanding of  the national self, the global order, and digital politics.
Another common analytical framing ties Russia’s advancement of  the multipolar digital 
order to its relative economic resurgence since the early 2000s and its ensuing geopolitical 
challenge to the US-led unipolarity. Yet, as I have shown, the multipolarity framework 
emerged in the first post-Soviet decade during Russia’s prolonged socio-economic crisis that 
accompanied its liberalizing market reforms. Specifically, I analyzed Russia’s policy proposal 
on international information security rooted in the ethos of  multipolarity, which it submitted 
to the United Nations immediately after the August 1998 financial collapse. While economic 
growth in the 2000s certainly afforded Russia with material capabilities to pose a greater 
challenge to the liberal order, including in the arena of  digital politics, digital multipolarism 
clearly predates Russia’s political-economic rise. 
Scholars have also recently proposed that Russia’s emphasis on sovereignty in the digital 
space stems from its ontological insecurity rooted in its relative youth as a nation-state. 
The implication of  this approach is that the more mature and economically stable Russia 
became over the post-Soviet years, the closer its stance would approximate that of  the 
long-established cosmopolitan states that feel safe in their sovereignty and do not feel 
the need to challenge the digital status quo. Yet, the opposite has been the case: Russia’s 
counter-hegemonic critique of  the existing internet governance system became increasingly 
pronounced precisely as Russia gained greater ontological security with the resurgence of  
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its geopolitical weight in recent years. Moreover, established Western states like France and 
Germany have increasingly embraced the framework of  digital sovereignty and challenged 
the US-led internet governance model.   
Beyond the investigation into the cultural logics of  Russia’s internet governance agenda, this 
paper’s analytical lens points to a broader theoretical opening in approaching the question 
of  why states advance different visions for the global internet. Using the case of  Russia’s 
challenge to the US-led digital order stemming from its great power identity, this essay 
has shown how analytically centering cultural factors such as a nation’s historic identity as 
expressed in political and policy discourse generates more nuanced understandings of  the 
logics and rhetoric behind states’ internet governance normative visions. Future research 
ideally will develop a comprehensive cultural framework of  internet governance to employ 
for global comparative research of  national internet governance agendas.
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